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Abstract: The literature on nonprofit management has embraced the concept 
of “accountability” to target urgent challenges related to NGO probity and integrity, and 
the literature witnessed attempts to use rational-choice-based governance approaches to 
solve them. Though existing principal-agent frameworks provide important insights, 
they are limited to the analysis of financial relationships between NGOs and donors. We 
contribute to the literature in developing a comprehensive rational-choice-based 
governance approach to analyze all stakeholder relationships of NGOs. Applying the 
research program of ordonomics, we unpack two fundamental interaction problems: (a) the 
“stakeholder dilemma” between the NGO and a single accountability holder as a one-
sided social dilemma and (b) the “competition dilemma” among rival NGOs as many-
sided social dilemma. We show that improving NGO accountability in relation to 
‘intended’ beneficiaries, peer organizations and the general public also requires 
identifying the underlying governance problem as a competition dilemma focusing on 
collective self-regulation as a solution. 
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Distinguishing One-Sided from Many-Sided Social Dilemmas in  
NGO Accountability 
 
Introduction 
Non-governmental organizations (henceforth: NGOs1) are generally perceived by the public 
as trustworthy and benign actors, particularly in comparison to political institutions and the 
corporate sector (Edelman, 2015). Nevertheless, recent years have witnessed several NGO 
scandals related to corruption or the mismanagement and misappropriation of funds 
(Gibelman and Gelman 2001, Greenle et al. 2007). In addition, NGOs are criticized for 
morally controversial but legal behavior such as the misinformation or even the deception of 
the general public, which has resulted in increased efforts to analyze and improve the sector’s 
reputation for probity and integrity (Hortsch 2010, Will and Pies 2016). 
Many scholars in the field of non-profit management have expressed fears that the series of 
scandals will threaten the “moral capital”2 (Crack 2013a, p. 813) of NGOs, undermining their 
role as credible advocates of social causes (Ebrahim 2003). Although only a minority of 
NGOs seems to be involved in defamatory scandals, the moral misconduct of a single NGO 
may even cause substantial reputational damages for other, non-involved NGOs. Thus, even 
                                                 
1 The term ‘NGO’ is notoriously broad. It can be applied to a variety of different organizational forms (Vakil, 
1997). Based on a recent “comprehensive definition” by Martens (2002 p. 282), NGOs can be seen as “societal 
actors,” i.e. as “formal (professionalized) independent societal organizations whose primary aim is to promote 
common goals at the national or the international level.” We follow this broader definition, which also embeds 
Salamon and Anheier’s (1992) characterization of non-profit organizations (NPOs) featuring institutionalization, 
independence, non-distribution constraint, self-government and voluntary participation. 
2 According to Kane (2001, p. 10), moral capital is “a resource that can be employed for legitimating some 
persons, positions and offices and for delegitimating others, for mobilizing support and for disarming opposition, 
for creating and exploiting political opportunities that otherwise would not exist.” The “quantum” of “moral 
capital is when “people judge the agents or institutions to be both faithful and effective in in serving those values 
and goals.” 
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NGOs with the highest standards of conduct have a stake in this debate, since there is an ever-
present threat that the activities of rogue NGOs could cause a crisis of public confidence that 
affects the credibility of the sector as a whole (Brown and Kalegaonkar 2002, Prakash and 
Gugerty 2010, Omona and Mukuye 2013).  
NGOs and academics have developed the concept of NGO accountability3 to address these 
challenges (Slim 2002), using stakeholder theory as a relational approach to frame the various 
relationships (Brown and Moore 2001, Benjamin 2008, Cordery and Baskerville 2010, 
Schmitz et. al. 2012). Legal accountability matters in the case of NGOs violating national or 
international law (Slim 2002), and it is intended to inhibit financial misconduct such as 
embezzlement. Depending on the wording of the specific national law, however, legal 
accountability does not necessarily cover all cases of mismanagement. Such misbehavior then 
need to be addressed with the broader concept of moral accountability that can be invoked 
whenever NGO behavior conflicts with the “social values and public constituencies that it was 
formed to advocate and represent” (Jepson 2005, p. 520). Thus, moral accountability is a 
much broader, more open and thus also more contested concept to which the many academic 
discussions bear vital testimony (Ebrahim 2004, Lister 2003, Williams and Taylor 2013). 
Whenever we allude to “NGO accountability” in this paper, we refer to this broader notion of 
the moral accountability of NGOs.  
In this article, we take the literature (Cooley and Ron 2002, Cornforth 2003, Prakash and 
Gugerty 2010) forward in developing a comprehensive rational-choice-based governance 
approach of NGO behavior by applying the research program of “ordonomics” (Pies et al. 
2009, Valentinov et al. 2013). Existing principal-agent frameworks provide a sharp analysis 
                                                 
3 The prevailing understanding of NGO accountability is perhaps most succinctly summarized by Slim as a 
‘process by which an NGO holds itself openly responsible for what it believes, what it does and what it does not 
do in a way which shows it involving all concerned parties and actively responding to what it learns’ (Slim 2002, 
original emphasis).  
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of predominantly financial relationships between NGOs and donor characterized by 
elaborated contractual rights, including the right to demand reports and evaluation procedures 
(Cordery and Baskerville 2010). In addition, the donor’s potential threat to withdraw funds 
creates a strong incentive for NGOs to meet donor standards. However, the limitations of 
principal-agent frameworks become evident when applied to the domain of non-financial 
NGO-stakeholder relations, in which potential principals possess only low sanctioning 
potential. 
We can show that improving NGO accountability to ‘intended’ beneficiaries, peer 
organizations4 and the general public requires (a) identifying the underlying governance 
problem—i.e. as a one-sided “stakeholder dilemma” between the NGO and a single 
accountability holder— or as a many-sided “competition dilemma” among rival NGOs—, and 
(b) focusing on collective self-regulation as a solution (cf. XXX 2015). 
We develop this argument in three steps: Following Crack’s (2013a) ‘two-waves-
framework’ we review the literature on NGO accountability in section 1, with a special focus 
on the rational-choice-based approaches of Prakash and Gugerty (2010) as well as Cooley and 
Ron (2002). In section 2, we introduce the ordonomic approach (Pies et al. 2009), briefly 
discuss its basic assumptions, and develop the conceptual distinction between one-sided social 
dilemma and many-sided social dilemma. In section 3, we apply this basic conceptual 
distinction to clarify the concept of NGO accountability, reconstructing two different 
interaction problems whose solution requires fundamentally different accountability 
mechanisms. In section 4, we discuss potential reform options. The paper concludes with 
implications for further research. 
1. Literature Review: Governance Perspectives on NGO Accountability  
                                                 
4 ‘Peer organizations’ refer to NGOs that share a broad commitment to accountability. 
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The academic interest in NGO accountability stems from the global development of civil 
society within the last 25 years. After the Cold War, NGOs assumed a more prominent role in 
publicizing otherwise neglected social and environmental challenges in global public 
discourses, thus contributing to the democratic validity of governance (cf. Crack 2013b, p. 3). 
Yet, NGOs also attracted much criticism for mismanagement, questionable practices in 
fundraising, corruption and for misleading the general public, which led to calls from donors 
and the media for greater accountability from the non-profit sector (Cavill and Sohail 2007, p. 
233; Crack 2013a). 
In addition, NGOs were assuming an increasingly prominent role in criticizing the 
accountability of political actors and corporations (Hortsch 2010, p. 129), thereby influencing 
public discourse via agenda setting, but rendering themselves vulnerable to criticisms that 
they were not subject to the similar levels of accountability that they demanded from others 
(Hammer et al. 2010, p. 1). Leading NGOs began to engage in a sector-wide debate about the 
meaning of ‘accountability’ for NGOs. The establishment of major self-regulation initiatives 
such as the Sphere Project in 1997 and the INGO Accountability Charter in 2006 signaled that 
leading NGOs had reached common agreement that ‘accountability’ should encompass 
principles of transparency, participation and answerability (http://www.sphereproject.org, 
http://www.ingoaccountabilitycharter.org). 
To review the literature on the governance dimensions of NGO accountability, we use 
Crack’s (2013a) “two-waves” framework both to illustrate why governance reforms in NGO 
accountability increasingly address issues related to advocacy (Section 1.1) and how the two 
most advanced and comprehensive rational-choice approaches to NGO accountability fail to 
address related challenges (Section 1.2).  
1.1 Two Waves of NGO Accountability: Mapping Stakeholder Relationships and 
Accountability Mechanisms 
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Although governance reforms vary heavily across regional and organizational factors, Crack’s 
(2013a) “two-waves” framework helps mapping the panorama of NGO-stakeholder 
relationships. In doing so, we follow the broadly accepted convention to use notions of 
“stakeholder relations” to frame the various connections and the accountability demands 
between NGOs and their stakeholders (cf. also Brown and Moore 2001, Benjamin 2008, 
Cordery and Baskerville 2010, Schmitz et. al. 2012).  
 ((1)) The first wave of accountability reforms amongst leading NGOs addressed 
“accountability for good governance”. This was primarily a defensive strategy by NGOs to 
serve the “strategic needs to placate governments and donors to protect their autonomy from 
external regulation and maintain their funding base“ (Crack 2013a, p. 813). Accountability 
was practiced using governance mechanisms such as monitoring and evaluation, which had 
been developed in the private sector, and have become prevalent in the public sector under the 
‘new public management’ approach. In the first wave of NGO accountability, governance 
reforms focused primarily on professional management, and transparency with respect to 
funding and expenditure, and upward-focused (Slim 2002) relationships that were prioritized 
with donors (Sloan 2009, Szper and Prakash 2010, AbouAssi 2012), and political/legal 
authorities (Cordery and Baskerville 2010, Phillips 2012). 
((2)) The second wave of accountability reforms addressed “accountability to mission” – in 
other words, the challenge of staying ‘true’ to the guiding ethos of the organization. The 
second wave was a reaction to what critics term the “paradox of greater NGO accountability” 
(O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008, 1). According to this criticism, the strategic focus of NGO 
accountability on powerful “upward”-stakeholders often resulted in perverse consequences, 
particularly in terms of further marginalizing the voices, needs and desires of intended 
beneficiaries (cf. also Ebrahim 2005, Murtaza 2011, Schmitz et. al. 2012, Hug and Jäger 
2013). In an effort to find a remedy for this paradoxical situation, second-wave reforms 
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conceived of NGO accountability responsibilities as encompassing demands and needs of a 
larger “downward”-focused (Kilby 2006) stakeholder environment, including ‘intended 
beneficiaries’ (cf. Saxton and Guo 2011, Schmitz et. al. 2012, Chen 2012, Williams and 
Taylor 2013), NGO personnel and members (Crack 2014), and “horizontally”-focused, peer 
organizations (Murtaza 2011). In addition to complying with ‘good governance’ (first wave) 
accountability standards, second wave governance reforms promoted organizational 
procedures capable of safeguarding the organization’s integrity and enabling it to fulfil its 
mission (Cavill and Sohail 2007, p. 234). Examples include the introduction of consultation 
procedures with the target community and the membership, and the establishment of internal 
as well as external self-regulation mechanisms (Ebrahim 2003, Williams and Taylor 2013). 
Most importantly, strengthening accountability to second wave stakeholders is particularly 
challenging for the advocacy function of NGOs, both in identifying relevant second-wave 
stakeholders and in measuring the effectiveness of a specific advocacy activity for the 
relevant stakeholder group (Brown and Moore 2001). 
1.2 Rational-Choice-Based Governance Approaches to NGO Accountability 
This distinction between the two waves of NGO accountability proves a useful typology of 
NGO-stakeholder relationships to elucidate the strengths and weaknesses of the two rational-
choice based governance approaches to NGO accountability, which clearly stand out from the 
literature as the most comprehensive and elaborated perspectives.  
((1)) Based on a principal-agent framework, Prakash and Gugerty (2010, 7) develop an 
“agency dilemma” to analyze the incentive problems that occur among NGOs and financial 
stakeholders due to asymmetric information. Originally developed as a rational-choice 
approach to analyze and govern the owner-manager relations in modern for-profit firms 
characterized by a separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling 1976), Prakash 
and Gugerty (2010: 4) transfer the underlying analytical perspective from corporations to 
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service-delivery NGOs. In other words, Prakash and Gugerty (2010) draw a direct analogy 
between the for-profit firm’s financing problem and the non-profit NGO’s funding problem. 
Whereas the corporate governance literature discusses appropriate governance schemes to 
align the manager’s interests with those of the shareholders, Prakash and Gugerty (2010, p. 4) 
address incentive problems of NGOs and their managers to act in the interests of their donors: 
“[T]the principal-agent framework that we employ […] focuses attention on the role of donors 
as principals and identifies appropriate governance mechanisms that are consistent with doing 
what the donor wants.”   
Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) ‘club’ approach is presented as a natural extension of the 
underlying principal-agent framework. Within the relationship between the NGO (agent) and 
the donor (principal), agents need a signal of credibility that they will not exploit or otherwise 
misappropriate the principal’s support. To encourage donor support, NGOs can send a signal 
of credibility either individually or collectively. A voluntary regulation ‘club’ that provides 
standards for accountability, transparency and good governance, including sanctions in case 
of misbehavior, is seen by Prakash and Gugerty as a way for NGOs to band together 
collectively to send strong and credible signals to donors and governments, particularly if 
supplemented with strong sanctions for non-compliance.  
Though clubs are functional forms of self-regulation, it is important to keep in mind that 
Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) clubs primarily aim at solving agency dilemmas in NGO 
financing and funding. In fact, it would be alien to a principal-agent framework with a focus 
on financial relationships to interpret any other actor than donors as principals. As a result, 
Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) governance approach confines its stakeholder analysis to a 
particular subset of actors. Other stakeholders, in particular ‘intended beneficiaries’ and peer 
organizations, are emphatically not the subjects of their principal-agent concept. Yet both the 
literature and NGO malpractice are testimony to the urgent need to address not only first-
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wave, but also second-wave reforms, which pose equally important challenges to NGO 
accountability. Though Prakash and Gugerty (2010, p. 8) underline the significance of these 
problems, they remain skeptical about current efforts to address these challenges effectively:  
“While there has been a great deal of rhetoric about making nonprofits more “accountable” to their 
beneficiaries, this rhetoric is rarely matched by actual incentives or mechanisms through which beneficiaries 
can hold nonprofits to account. Thus beneficiaries remain clients or customers of nonprofits rather than 
becoming principals. Principals and beneficiaries sit at the two different ends of the value chain (or the 
charity chain in our context).” 
((2)) Cooley and Ron’s (2002) political-economy approach focuses specifically on 
International Organizations (IO) and on INGOs in the sectors of humanitarian aid and refugee 
relief as well as economic and technical assistance. Their rational-choice analysis is illustrated 
by three country case studies (Kyrgyzstan, Tanzania and Eastern Zaire as well as Bosnia), 
which highlight the competitive constraints faced by NGOs and IOs.  
Similar to Prakash and Gugerty (2010), Cooley and Ron (2002) use the principal-agent 
framework to identify various principal-agent problems along a ‘contracting chain’ of donors 
(IOs), contractors (INGOs) and recipients (local partners), e.g. in the service delivery of 
development aid. Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 15) model this relationship “as a double set of 
‘principal-agent’ problems wherein the donor is a ‘principal’ and contractors are ‘agents.’ At 
the lower level of the hierarchy, the contractor functions as the principal and the aid recipient 
as the agent.” Along this relationship, Cooley and Ron (2002) analyze dysfunctional 
incentives for agents in short-term-contracting triggered by asymmetric information.  
In contrast to Prakash and Gugerty (2010), however, Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7) highlight 
that NGOs operate in a competitive environment with several NGOs competing for funding 
and securing contracts. Even worse, this competition is becoming more and more intense due 
to a growing number of NGOs and the common practice among IOs to use short-term-
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contracts for service delivery, whose compliance is then monitored by hard performance 
indicators. As competition increases uncertainty it also threatens to diminish the quality of 
service delivery within the projects, a potentially poor result that Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 7) 
interpret as a ‘multiple-principals problem’: 
“Because alternative contractors threaten to appropriate projects, INGOs are under constant pressure to 
renew, extend, or win new contracts, regardless of the project's overall utility. Some INGO headquarters 
order their country offices to become financially self-sufficient, exacerbating the competitive dynamic. 
Securing new funding is an ever-expanding part of the INGO's function, pushing other concerns—such as 
ethics, project efficacy, or self-criticism—to the margins” (Cooley and Ron 2002, p. 16). 
For Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 17), this competitive environment creates dysfunctional 
incentives for NGOs to “seek to undermine competitors, conceal information, and act 
unilaterally.” If this is correct, moral behavior will be compromised by financial efforts to 
secure funds and short-run organizational survival, which will be to the expense of the 
project’s performance. Yet, although even strong dysfunctional incentives leave room for 
deviation,5 Cooley and Ron’s (2002, p. 30) case studies indicate that individual NGOs find it 
extremely difficult to threaten the organization’s survival for the sake of moral considerations. 
As a result, Cooley and Ron (2002, p. 37) claim that “[w]estern donors and IOs must design 
humanitarian market institutions with greater care” to mitigate the negative incentives caused 
by dysfunctional competition. To achieve this, the authors suggest replacing the practice of 
short-term contracting by introducing long-term contracts.  
((3)) In sum, Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) principal-agent-framework enables a profound 
and sharp analysis of funding problems between donors and NGOs, including reasonable 
reform options. Cooley and Ron (2002) highlight that competition among NGOs is apt to 
aggravate the incentive problems inherent in principal-agent relations between NGOs and 
                                                 
5 In particular, a strong moral disposition of faith-based NGO might prompt a stronger resistance in face of 
dysfunctional incentives. Other important considerations include the opportunity cost to cancel contracts and 
attract alternative sources of funding (Cooley and Ron 2002, p. 30). 
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their donors, generating dysfunctional incentives and negative outcomes. This can lead to 
“mission deflection” or “mission creep” as coined by Minkoff and Powell (2006, p. 592). In 
addition to Minkoff and Powell’s (2006) focus on mission deflection as an organizational 
phenomenon—caused e.g. by a strong dependence on a single donor—Cooley and Ron’s 
(2002) analysis of competitive pressures among NGOs provides good reasons for considering 
also the case of a ‘collective’ form of mission deflection. Published more than 10 years ago, 
Cooley and Ron’s (2002) approach retains contemporary relevance because it addresses peer 
organizations as important NGO stakeholders. Both frameworks focus on the funding 
problem of service-delivery NGOs and their accountability relationships with their principals 
(donors). Yet, they turn a blind eye on challenges relevant in second-wave reforms of NGO 
accountability, in particular those related to NGO advocacy.  
The literature is rife with normative recommendations to address NGO accountability 
deficits to second-wave stakeholders (cf. also Ebrahim 2005, Murtaza 2011, Hug and Jäger 
2013). Schmitz et al. (2012, p. 1175, italics added), for example, when considering the 
“decoupling of aspiration and practice,” recommend that NGOs “have to be willing to share 
more meaningful information about their work and outcomes with stakeholders. Practicing 
transparency that empowers beneficiaries is central to effective organizational learning and 
balancing demands from different stakeholders.” Yet, such normative claims appear 
surprisingly helpless in light of their own assessment that, in fact, NGO leaders do display 
very high aspirations to fulfil the needs of their stakeholders. From our point of view, such 
claims a fortiori underline the unchanged need for a rational-choice analysis that assumes 
NGOs (and their leaders) not to lack a strong will to be accountable to second-wave 
stakeholders, but to lack proper incentives to do so in practice (Prakash and Gugerty 2010).  
Against this backdrop, we believe that NGO accountability can benefit from a conceptual 
perspective that addresses stakeholders such as personnel and members, intended 
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beneficiaries and peer organizations with the same conceptual accuracy of a rational-choice 
approach as donors and funders. A comprehensive framework of NGO accountability requires 
an analysis of the institutional conditions of the whole panorama of NGO-stakeholder 
relations, including the competitive environment of NGOs, covering both the service delivery 
and the advocacy of NGOs. In an effort to do so, the following section presents ordonomics as 
research program capable of providing such a framework.  
2. The Ordonomic Rational-Choice-Approach to NGO Accountability 
“Ordonomics” represents a particular rational-choice perspective that has proven informative 
in the academic debates on corporate citizenship, new-governance initiatives, and tri-sectoral 
partnerships, because it highlights how business firms can act as governance entrepreneurs by 
engaging in self-regulation to create mutual benefits (cf. Pies et al. 2014; 2010). The term 
‘ordo’ refers both to the institutional and ideational orders that structure interactions among 
individuals (Pies 2009). Ordonomics is a research program interested in the interdependence 
between institutions and ideas, i.e. how mental models and other semantic thought categories 
shape the rule environment for interactions—the social structure—and vice versa. A 
particular focus of the ordonomic approach is to take seriously both the organizational (self-
)interests and the larger interests of society, which allows developing reform options that 
create win-win-solutions, and not conflicts, among the focal organization and its stakeholders 
using an “orthogonal position” (Pies 2009). 
Here, we apply the ordonomic research program to analyze the self-regulation efforts of 
NGOs (cf. Valentinov et al. 2013, 2015), and we develop a win-win semantics (ideas) that 
facilitates institutional or governance reforms related to NGO accountability. In particular, we 
show how ordonomics is useful in analyzing a broad spectrum of NGO behavior and 
interactions, including the issues and stakeholders relevant in ‘second wave’ reforms. We 
present the ordonomic approach of the institutional order of NGO accountability in three 
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steps: First, we outline how a simple rational choice theory can be applied to analyze NGO 
behavior, and how it can be useful to provide counter-intuitive explanations for NGO 
behavior as a non-intended consequence of individually-rational behavior (2.1). Second, we 
distinguish two paradigmatic types of social dilemma situations (2.2). Based on this 
distinction, we show that one-sided and many sided social dilemmas require different types of 
governance reforms, namely individual and collective self-binding commitments (2.3).  
2.1 Rational-Choice Theory: A Method for Analyzing Actor Behavior 
Following Gary Becker’s (1992, 37) strategy to use the “economic approach” for an analysis 
of “social issues that range beyond those usually considered by economists,” rational-choice 
theory can be seen as an “imperialistic” method to analyze the general behavior of (human) 
actors. Gary Becker’s notion of rationality views actors to “maximize welfare as they 
conceive it, whether they be selfish, altruistic, loyal, spiteful, or masochistic” (ibid.; italics in 
original). This idea of rationality assumes little more than actors making prudent choices, i.e. 
that they choose those courses of action among a variety of options (means) which best fulfill 
their objectives (ends). Most importantly, however, this assumption is a methodological 
decision (the famous “as if”-assumption) and not an ontological statement about the nature of 
human beings or about their ‘real’ thought processes, let alone a normative statement about 
the desirability of particular ends actors wish to achieve. This methodological openness 
allows rational-choice theory to be applied to a wide range of social phenomena, far beyond 
the narrow field of economic exchange. 
“Imperialistic” rational-choice approaches are very careful in ascribing the different action 
parameters to the two categories of means and ends. When applied to NGOs as organizational 
actors, a rational-choice approach explicitly acknowledges that NGOs cultivate a self-
conception as norm-driven actors and, thus, interprets the mission of NGOs as their final goal 
(end). To achieve this end, NGOs use financial and human resources, e.g. by generating 
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member support, attracting donations and gaining public attention (means), to engage in 
strategies such as service delivery or cause-based campaigning or advocacy (interim ends). 
This understanding echoes Prakash and Gugerty’s (2007, p. 1) assumption that “NGOs as 
collective actors … seek to fulfill both normative concerns and instrumental incentives.” 
2.2 Good Intentions, Bad Outcomes: From Moral Dilemmas to Social Dilemmas  
The rational-choice approach has often been criticized for its tautological nature, even 
among prominent economists. Amartya Sen (1977, p. 325), e.g., criticizes that rational 
behavior “is to be ‘explained in terms of preferences, which are in turn defined only by 
behavior.’ Not surprisingly, excursions into circularities have been frequent.” In contrast to 
Sen (1977), we concur with Gary Becker’s idea that a case-oriented application of this 
tautology demonstrates its explanatory power in providing counter-intuitive insights (Becker 
1992). In fact, the rational-choice approach that follows Becker’s methodology can be called 
“abductive,” an approach which is “neither purely inductive or deductive,” because it 
constantly searches for “the most plausible and coherent set of explanations consistent with 
the available data” (Heckman 2015, p. 3-4).6  
Thus, instead of falling into the trap of attributing the adverse aspects of NGO behavior to 
the actor’s bad intentions, morally controversial preferences or to pure chance, the rational-
choice approach provides a heuristic to explain how reported and stated intentional behavior 
can lead to empirically observable, non-intended consequences. Take the example of NGOs 
that played a tragic role after the infamous genocide in Rwanda 1994. Having been trapped in 
a moral dilemma, NGOs provided humanitarian aid to “members of the Hutu and perpetrators 
of the genocide” in refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the aftermath of 
the crisis, NGOs themselves feared that their “well-intentioned actions led to the prolongation 
                                                 
6 For Heckman (2015, p. 3-4), Gary S. “Becker abducted economics,” specifying that in “many of his efforts to 
understand economic phenomena, he brought creative insights in response to initial mismatches between models 
and data.“ 
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of the conflict and the suffering of refugees in the camps“ (Deloffre 2010, p. 186). Instead of 
(only) paying lip service to their moral duties, the concerned NGOs responded with an effort 
to reform the incentives under which they severely suffered: They increasingly engaged in 
collective accountability clubs and began replacing a “truck and chuck” approach for a more 
holistic root-focused approach (Deloffre 2010, p. 187), which constituted a fundamental 
conceptual shift in humanitarian aid.  
Sure, this is an extreme example, and it is not a perfect analogy to the kind of moral 
misconduct of NGO we described earlier. Yet, it well illustrates the structural need for a 
heuristic approach capable of explaining the fatal consequences of “well-intentioned actions” 
and developing reform options that avoids the tragic choices in moral dilemmas. Instead of 
giving ethically well-informed advice of how to best position within a moral dilemma, the 
ordonomic approach systematically translates moral dilemmas into social dilemma situations. 
Social dilemmas are a specific heuristic ‘lense’ to analyze and explain how intentional 
behavior can lead to non-intentional consequences. A social dilemma is a situation of 
collective self-damage “in which rational actors fail to realize their common interests due to 
conflicting individual interests” (Beckmann et al. 2014, p. 26). Yet the social dilemma ‘lense’ 
is not only a specific analytical perspective. Social dilemma situations can also be viewed 
from an empirical perspective as a “signum of modern societies,” and observers propose 
different explanations for their relative occurrence: Valentinov and Chatalova (2016) invoke 
Luhmann’s (1977) functional differentiation of modern societies in autopoietic systems to 
argue that social dilemmas are emergent due to the “systems’ disregard of their environment,” 
while Hielscher and Pies (2016) refer to North et al. (2009) to argue that social dilemmas 
result from the overwhelming significance of competition in modern society, especially in the 
economy, in politics, and in civil society. 
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The ordonomic rational-choice approach differentiates between two archetypical forms of 
social dilemma situations in which the involved actors miss the opportunity to realize a win-
win potential of cooperation: A one-sided social dilemma is an interaction problem 
characterized by the possibility of asymmetric exploitation between two actors (Kreps, 1990). 
Actor A can exploit actor B, but not vice versa. If B anticipates the exploitation upon his 
cooperation, he is “unlikely to cooperate, even though successful cooperation would be 
mutually advantageous” (Beckmann et al. 2014, p. 26). This situation leaves both actors 
worse off. Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) “agency dilemma” of funding is a specific sub-form 
of a one-sided social dilemma, in which donors hold back their intended funding because they 
fear their support will be exploited by NGOs.  
A many-sided social dilemma is a symmetric situation in which cooperation fails due to the 
reciprocal opportunity for mutual exploitation (Bowles 2004, p. 23–55). A famous example of 
such situation was described by Hardin (1968) as the “tragedy of the commons,” in which all 
actors can mutually exploit each other. This scenario represents a situation of collective self-
damage because each actor behaves exactly the way he fears the others will, that is, 
exclusively in their own self-interest (Beckmann et al 2014, p. 26). The many-sided social 
dilemma is particularly useful for analyzing the incentive structure of “collective action 
problems” which arise among competing NGOs (Prakash and Gugerty 2007, p. 1). In a many-
sided social dilemma, the pursuit of moral ends can be contested if (only) immoral behavior is 
presumed to ensure a competitive advantage over other NGOs or even organizational survival. 
For example, a race-to-the-bottom competition for public awareness can tempt NGOs to 
incrementally reduce quality standards in their promotional campaigns, favoring 
sensationalism over sober representation of the issues. This undermines the reputation of the 
NGO as a trustworthy actor, and it can also endanger the credibility of the whole NGO sector 
if negative reputation effects “spill over” to other NGOs (Will and Pies 2016). In a similar 
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way, competition among NGOs for funding can promote the adoption of management 
instruments imported from the private sector that shall secure a financial accountability to 
donors and commissioning agents. Yet, a perceived economization of NGOs or an extreme 
managerialism might also threaten the identity of NGOs that view and describe themselves as 
moral actors (Dichter 1999). Such effects join the ranks of unintended consequences of 
intentional behavior of NGOs. 
2.3 Infusing Order: Individual and Collective Self-Binding Commitments 
Building on Williamson’s (2009; p. 456) understanding of governance as a “means by which 
to infuse order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gain,“ it is possible to argue 
that overcoming the collective self-damage inherent in social dilemmas situations require 
appropriate governance mechanisms in the form of self-binding commitments.7 
In a one-sided social dilemma, the potential exploiter A can bind herself with an individual 
commitment. If this commitment lends credibility to A’s promise not to exploit actor B, B 
will be more willing to cooperate, and both sides can reap the win–win rewards of their 
cooperation. In contrast, overcoming a many-sided social dilemma requires a collective 
commitment—an individual self-commitment is insufficient. If just one actor engaged in 
unconditional cooperation, the others would still have an incentive, perhaps even a stronger 
one, to exploit this cooperative behavior. A way to avoid this collective self-damage is 
through a credible collective self-commitment that changes the incentives for all actors and 
induces them to simultaneously change their strategies (Beckmann et al. 2014, p. 26). 
Following our rational-choice-based governance approach, the term ‘commitment’ refers 
to influencing an actor’s behavior by changing incentives. This term is not synonymous with 
                                                 
7 From a system theory perspective, Valentinov and Chatalova (2016, p. 6) argue that overcoming social 
dilemma situations in general calls for a “weakening of incentives.” For an institutional economic perspective on 
how to establish a differentiated management of social dilemmas in modern society, cf. Hielscher and Pies 
(2016).  
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the term ‘accountability mechanism’ which, according to Slim (2002), means delivering 
information and responsiveness to NGO stakeholders. The relationship between both terms 
resembles the relationship between methodology and content: A formal accountability 
mechanism can prescribe NGOs to disclose information or to respond to complaints, such as 
the INGO Charter’s (2016) “Complaints Handling Mechanism.” From a governance 
perspective, this accountability mechanism can also feature a commitment logic insofar as it 
helps e.g. a focal NGO to individually bind itself to the promise not to exploit a single 
stakeholder’s prior investment.  
3. Identifying One-Sided and Many-Sided Social Dilemmas in NGO Accountability 
Practice 
The existing literature on NGO accountability faces difficulties addressing the second-wave 
accountability challenges—i.e. the problems related to accountability to mission—, because it 
provides little guidance for how to conceptually capture the relationships between NGOs and 
second-wave stakeholders, such as ‘intended beneficiaries’ and peer organizations. If these 
challenges are not adequately addressed, there is every reason to fear the erosion of the whole 
NGO sector’s credibility and “moral capital” (Crack 2013a, p. 812), with potentially 
devastating effects on NGO agenda-setting and problem-solving capacities. In this section, we 
apply the ordonomic approach to the different NGO-stakeholder relations and analyze them as 
interaction problems, i.e. ((1)) as a one-sided stakeholder dilemma and ((2)) as a many-sided 
competition dilemma. After that, we propose ((3)) a typology of governance mechanisms for 
NGO accountability based on the two-wave-framework that demonstrates how one-sided 
stakeholder dilemmas overlap with many-sided competition dilemmas. In discussing various 
social dilemma situations, we are providing primarily examples of advocacy NGOs. Yet, the 
same logic of distinguishing one-sided and many-sided social dilemmas in NGO 
accountability can also be applied to service-delivery NGOs. 
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((1)) One-sided social dilemmas: The first interaction problem can be interpreted as a 
vertical relationship between an NGO and its stakeholders such as donors, government 
bodies, NGO staff or intended beneficiaries. Donors provide valuable funds and demand 
transparency about their expenditure and evidence of performance; government bodies grant 
tax exemption privileges to NGOs but impose restrictions on political activities in return; 
personnel and members put their personal integrity at risk and demand delivery of mission; 
and, certainly with limits, ‘intended beneficiaries’ confer status to NGOs as authentic 
advocates of their interests, and to some extent, legitimize NGOs’ activities through their 
cooperation (Crack 2013a, p. 813 et seq., see also table 1).  
Following Pies et al.’s (2009, p. 383 et seq.) game-theoretic rational-choice framework, the 
interaction between NGOs and their stakeholders can be analyzed as a one-sided prisoners’ 
dilemma (Kreps 1990), which is characterized by the possibility of asymmetric exploitation. 
In contrast to Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) “agency dilemma,” we refer to this dilemma as a 
“stakeholder dilemma” to leave the door open also for stakeholders other than donors and 
funders (Figure 1a)8: The stakeholder —the donor, the government, personnel, members or 
intended beneficiaries— can choose between the strategy to “support” and “not support” the 
NGO. The NGO can choose between being “accountable” and “not being accountable,” i.e. 
the NGO can decide whether to exploit or not to exploit the support provided by the 
stakeholder. 9 The ordinal pay-offs indicate the result of each player’s individual cost-benefit 
                                                 
8 We reconstruct the prisoner’s dilemma as a ‘one-shot-game’, which is a special case and indeed very reductive. 
In fact, game theorists can show that the tendency to cooperate is much higher if games are played repetitively 
(Axelrod 1980). Yet, analyzing the situational logic of the underlying game helps describe the basic interaction 
problem under uncertainty and sheds light on the ‘rules of the game’ necessary to overcome the problem. Thus, 
our use of game theory follows Buchanan’s (1987, 1990) constitutional economic understanding who 
distinguishes between ‘choices among rules’ and ‘choices within the rules.’ Accordingly, overcoming a social 
dilemma requires addressing the “constitutional level.” 
9 For explanatory purposes, we use archetypical and, indeed, simplified strategy options for both players. We try 
to keep the game as simple and abstract as possible to emphasize its broad applicability. Of course, depending on 
the situation, it is possible to design a game tailored more closely to empirical situations, including more specific 
strategies. For example, instead of a binary strategy choice of being “accountable” or “not being accountable,” a 
game could be reconstructed in which the NGO, e.g. Amnesty International, can choose among two action plans, 
one of which features “greater long-term accountability” and the other “lower long-term accountability” to 
intended beneficiaries. With the ordinal pay-offs unchanged, given that the first action plan faces higher 
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analysis, with high numbers representing a high net benefit (comprising both monetary and 
non-monetary terms).  
------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
------------------------- 
Assuming rational actors, this game can be solved by backward induction. If the stakeholder 
provides specific support, the NGO has the potential to exploit it (2 ≻ 1). Yet anticipating the 
NGO being unaccountable, the stakeholder will decide not to support the NGO (0 ≻ –1). This 
game leads to the equilibrium result (0,0), which is suboptimal for both players. Both could 
profit if the stakeholder provided support and if the NGO did not exploit this support, which 
would result in a Pareto-superior strategy combination (1,1). The actual outcome of this game 
is collectively self-damaging because both players would prefer (1,1) over (0,0). This model 
illustrates the importance for NGOs to avoid being trapped in dysfunctional or even disastrous 
incentive structures.  
Figure 1b assumes that the NGO employs a governance mechanism in form of a sanction s 
that is strong enough to support a credible commitment. The promise not to exploit the 
stakeholder’s investment thus becomes trustworthy. The sanction is strong enough only if the 
strategy “not being accountable” loses its potential attractiveness, i.e. if the condition holds 
that 2 – s ≺ 1. As a consequence, the NGO will lose its interest in exploiting its stakeholder. 
Anticipating this change of incentives for the NGO, the stakeholder will go ahead with the 
investment. The new equilibrium (1,1) is pareto-superior. Here, an individual self-binding 
commitment of the NGO is a win-win strategy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
investments than the latter, our simplified version of the rational-choice analysis can thus easily incorporate the 
time dimension as well.  
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The literature on nonprofit management and public administration documents various 
forms of individual self-regulation aiming at governance reforms to solve “stakeholder 
dilemmas.” With regard to first wave stakeholders such as donors and governments, Ebrahim 
(2003) gives account of NGOs introducing self-commitments such as the production of 
regular reports to donors on the expenditure of funds and project evaluations, and compliance 
with official procedures in order to conform to the requirements of legal accountability. Both 
individual self-commitments are intended to help NGOs choose the strategy “being 
accountable” which in turn shall ensure the support of their stakeholders, be it institutional 
donors or state authorities (Fig. 1). In both cases, the promises seem to be credible in practice, 
because the related sanctions—represented by “s” in Fig. 1b—are observed to be strong, 
ranging from a complete withdrawal of funds to the imposition of fines or the denial of a 
registered status as tax privileged NGOs (Crack 2013a). 
Second wave governance mechanisms, especially their potential to effectively sanction 
NGOs misbehavior, prove much less effective (Prakash and Gugerty 2010, p. 8). A small 
number of NGOs introduced institutionalized democratic procedures and organizational 
bodies, including annual general meetings (AGMs) and board elections, in order to foster 
accountability to their members (e.g. Amnesty International, or AI). Other NGOs have 
attempted to formalize links with their intended beneficiaries by inviting representatives onto 
Advisory Boards (e.g. Save the Children). From the governance perspective of ordonomics 
(Pies et al. 2009, p. 389), these mechanisms can be interpreted as functional self-binding 
commitments and, thus, as a contribution to overcome a “stakeholder dilemma,” with NGOs 
attempting to fulfill their mission in accordance with the expectations of members, personnel 
and intended beneficiaries. It is important to note that these self-binding commitments are 
effective both for the service delivery and the advocacy function of NGOs in their relation to 
second-wave stakeholders. 
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Against this backdrop, waiving the funding sources of specific donors can be interpreted as 
an individual self-commitment of NGOs to prioritize their responsibilities to second wave 
accountability stakeholders. As an example, Amnesty International (2015a) states: “To ensure 
our independence, we do not seek or accept money from governments or political parties for 
our work in documenting and campaigning against human rights abuses. In no way do monies 
received from corporate donors influence or affect our ability to campaign.” Although directly 
addressed, it may be inaccurate to interpret this statement as a commitment of AI toward 
governments and corporate donors. In contrast, our framework suggests viewing this promise 
as a self-commitment of Amnesty International (named “NGO” in Fig. 1) to be accountable to 
their members and their personnel (named “Stakeholder” in Fig. 1). By publically announcing 
to forestall cooptation or capture by governments and corporations, AI promises to maintain 
and promote organizational integrity in fulfilling its mission (Minkoff and Powell 2006, p. 
595), which is an important precondition for the support and the collaboration of both 
members and personnel. This is a credible promise because members and personnel can easily 
observe the high costs of AI foregoing rich sources of external funding (sanction “s” in Fig. 
1b). Viewed from the ordonomic perspective, this example also illustrates and explains that 
NGOs promote accountability not only for monetary reasons, e.g. for maintaining 
membership fees, but also for non-monetary purposes, i.e. for sustaining member support, 
organizational reputation, as well as fulfilling AI’s mission in general. As AI has never 
accepted funding from governments since its foundation, this historical example also 
underlines that the “two-wave” framework is to be understood as an illustration for overall 
trends in NGO accountability, not as an analytical explanation for every single case (Crack 
2013a). 
Recent developments in implementing so-called “Complaints Handling Mechanisms” 
(CHM) of the INGO Accountability Charter (2016) provide more examples of individual self-
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commitment of NGOs. Directed primarily at NGO members and voluntary staff, CHMs are an 
effective tool to safeguard the support of second-wave stakeholder groups. Following the 
logic of self-constraining to secure mutual gains of future cooperation, the focal NGO (named 
“NGO” in Fig. 1) that adopts a CHM promises to give all stakeholders (named “Stakeholder” 
in Fig. 1) the opportunity to raise complaints related to perceived (moral) misconduct and to 
respond appropriately to all these complaints. As the promise to ‘respond to all complaints’ is 
easy to monitor and, thus, also to sanction for the affected stakeholders, the strategic option to 
ignore stakeholder complaints (i.e. ‘not being accountable’) becomes less attractive for the 
focal NGO. Although the CHM appears cost-intense from a resource-based view, the CHM’s 
advantage is to foster the individual NGO’s reputation, thereby safeguarding the support of 
current members and gaining potential new members, because the CHM supports 
organizational learning processes to strengthen the NGO’s stated mission. In sum, the CHM 
creates a win-win situation: it ‘pays off’ both for the organization and for members and 
voluntary staff.  
Yet, as in the case of the ‘intended beneficiaries,’ governance mechanisms such as CHM, 
social audits or community participation perform a much weaker effect of sanctioning 
perceived NGO misbehavior (Ebrahim et al. 2014). Though being a useful channel for direct 
feedback of intended beneficiaries, ad hoc participation remains only a vague instrument for 
intended beneficiaries to effectively influence NGO accountability. They do not compare to 
the influence consumers have to signal their disapproval with corporate decisions by changing 
their spending habits, or the power that voters have to hold political actors to account via the 
ballot box (Ronald 2010, p. 181). No doubt, these ‘second wave’ governance mechanisms 
provide much weaker incentives than those applied in NGO-donor relations.  
While our conceptual approach provides a framework to capture and clarify these 
governance mechanisms as a contribution to solve different “stakeholder dilemmas”, it faces 
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similar limitations as Prakash and Gugerty’s (2010) ‘agency dilemma.’ One reason for the 
decoupling of rhetoric and actual practice in NGO accountability (Schmitz et al. 2012) to 
intended beneficiaries is the (sometimes) weak potential of these stakeholders to effectively 
sanction irresponsible NGO behavior. This also seems to be one of Prakash and Gugerty`s 
(2010, 6-7) main concerns with amplifying the principal agent approach to a wider range of 
stakeholders. In many cases, dissatisfied ‘intended’ beneficiaries can stand up and declare 
publically that a certain organization did not adequately represent their interests. This can 
adversely affect perceptions of the integrity of the organization. However, other ‘intended’ 
beneficiaries, especially in developing countries, face much stronger difficulties to get heard 
by a wide audience and to build up a substantial sanction potential. For those stakeholders, 
“nonprofits are often the monopoly providers of essential products and services” (Prakash and 
Gugerty 2010, p. 5). Even more serious is the situation with primary constituencies such as 
‘future generations’ or ‘endangered species.’ Notwithstanding that it would be difficult to map 
these groups as “stakeholders” in our framework, it cannot be ignored that they are unable to 
protest against NGO misrepresentation of their interests.  
((2)) Many-sided social dilemmas: In many cases, staying true to mission, which is the 
specific focus of second wave accountability reforms, can assume the characteristics of a 
public good in an economic sense (Samuelson 1975). That means, if staying true to mission 
both in service delivery and in advocacy will not be effectively remunerated by any particular 
stakeholder group (or will not be effectively supported by stakeholder sanctions), NGOs may 
be tempted to occasionally give way to other, more ‘private,’ considerations, including 
financial incentives and donor interests. In fact, the mission drift or mission deflection so 
much bemoaned in second-wave accountability reforms can be seen as a type of free-riding 
that prevents the public good “mission fulfilment” to be effectively provided.  
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A typical situation in service delivery is when multiple NGOs are bidding for a contract 
with a commissioning agent. NGOs willing to be commissioned may be tempted by 
competition to decrease the quality of service delivery, while losing sight of their mission, but 
maintaining the agreed amount of funds. In this case, however, the NGO’s interests to staying 
true to its mission is directly supported by the strong interest of commissioning agents to 
increase the quality of service delivery, which, as a result, provide effective, sanction-based 
solutions (Cooley and Ron 2002). In contrast, staying true to mission is much harder to 
achieve for NGOs in their advocacy work. In this case, ‘weak’ stakeholders can lack the 
capability of supporting NGOs in fulfilling their mission. Then, NGOs may be tempted to 
campaign for funding with arguments and images that eventually gain public attention, but 
paint a misleading or even distorted picture of the situation of intended beneficiaries (Manzo 
2008).  
A potential candidate for providing sanctioning and, thus, the public good of mission 
fulfilment, is the general public as the primary addressee of most NGO advocacy. However, 
the general public consists of individual citizens who cannot be expected to solve the free-
riding problem of NGOs because they may remain “rationally-ignorant” about these issues. 
That means, it can be very costly to inform oneself about complex societal topics and to 
participate in public discourse (in terms of time and other resources). If those costs are 
considered prohibitively high in comparison to possible benefits, the individual citizen will 
remain ‘rationally-ignorant’ against monitoring NGO service delivery and advocacy work 
and, thus, will not provide effective governance assistance via sanctioning (Pincione and 
Tesón 2006, p. 15).  
Following Pies et al.’s (2009, p. 383 et seq.) game-theoretic rational-choice framework, the 
interaction problem of establishing and maintaining a reputation of staying ‘true to mission’ 
can be analyzed both as an individual and as a collective problem. The individual dimension 
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involves reputational mechanisms in the stakeholder dilemma as described above. The 
collective dimension addresses issues of collective reputation of the NGO sector as a whole, 
thus capturing cases when the misconduct of one NGO spills over to others and creates a 
negative reputation for non-involved NGOs. This collective case can be analyzed as a many-
sided social dilemma between multiple NGOs (or the whole NGO sector), which is 
characterized by the possibility of symmetric exploitation among members of this sector. We 
refer to this horizontal interaction problem as the “competition dilemma” among NGOs that 
can occur in different settings, both in service delivery and advocacy.  
In NGO advocacy, staying true to mission translates into responsible campaigning in light 
of typically rationally-ignorant citizens and a media bias that favors strident communication 
strategies (Swinnen 2011, Swinnen et al. 2011). Of course, ‘responsible campaigning’ is not 
(yet) a clearly-defined concept. Indicating a similar challenge, Lang (2013, p. 117-118) uses 
the concept of public accountability (cf. Will and Pies 2016) that entails transparency, debate, 
engagement and activation. In a similar fashion, Brown et al. (2012) highlight that 
International Advocacy NGOs addressing complex issues on multiple levels need to launch 
long-term campaigns to change policies that require “extensive planning, high-quality 
research, dedicated human resources [and] multi-year funding” (Brown et al. 2012, p. 1105). 
In practice, some leading INGOs have defined ‘responsible advocacy’ to include ‘accuracy of 
information’ as a relevant standard (INGO Charter 2016). On a national level, the Irish 
Association of Non-Governmental Development Organisations has implemented a sectoral 
voluntary Code of Conduct on Images and Messages that aims to “[a]void images and 
messages that potentially stereotype, sensationalise or discriminate against people, situations 
or places” (Dochas 2016).  
Figure 2a serves to illustrate the underlying logic of the competition dilemma with the 
well-known case of the two-sided prisoners’ dilemma (Pies et al. 2009), applied to the 
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specific case of responsible campaigning. Two NGOs (NGO 1 and NGO 2) each have the 
option to engage in a populist or “irresponsible campaign” or to refrain from doing so and to 
lead a “responsible campaign” instead. Assume that a single NGO’s campaign helps mobilize 
the scarce resource of public attention (and, thus, provides access to additional funding) by 
exaggerating or misrepresenting the needs of its distant beneficiaries or by otherwise feeding 
“the spurious and mistaken beliefs” (Pincione and Tesón 2006, p. 4) of the general public. In 
contrast, assume that a responsible campaign would largely rely on “truth-sensitive” 
arguments (Pincione and Tesón 2006, p. 17) that display the best available evidence in 
academic discourse (or on a nuanced and balanced position that incorporates the wide 
panorama of available arguments) to promote the NGO’s mission.10  
The ordinal payoffs indicate how the strategy combinations are valued by each NGO 
individually. The number before the comma applies to NGO 1, the number after the comma to 
NGO 2 (Figure 2a). 
------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
------------------------- 
Assuming rational NGOs, this game can easily be solved: If NGO 2 leads a populist 
campaign, it is beneficial for NGO 1 to do the same because, otherwise, it would gain less or 
even no public attention, with adverse effect for its mission (and its prospects for funding). A 
comparison between Boxes III and IV shows 2 ≻ 1. However, if NGO 2 invests in responsible 
campaigns, NGO 1 is again better off refusing responsible conduct, because populist 
campaigns yield a comparative advantage in public attention over NGO 2—a comparison 
between Boxes I and II shows 3 ≺ 4. As the same logic holds for NGO 2, it becomes obvious 
                                                 
10 When applied to fulfilling their mission in service delivery, the strategies for NGOs can be reconstructed as 
„mission-supporting service delivery“ and „mission-undermining service delivery.“   
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that under these circumstances both NGOs find themselves under strong pressure to lead 
irresponsible campaigns. Yet the strategy combination that results in Box III (Nash 
equilibrium) is Pareto-inferior compared to Box I. Both NGOs are trapped in a situation of 
collective self-damage: leading irresponsible campaigns undermines the collective credibility 
and integrity—i.e. the “moral capital” (Crack 2013a, p. 813) or the “reputation” (Prakash and 
Gugerty 2010, 6-7)—of NGOs as a group in their efforts to advocate the interests of 
marginalized groups, peoples and issues. In addition, it is important to note that NGOs do not 
intend to achieve this equilibrium; it rather evolves as a non-intended consequence of 
intentional behavior. It is a systemic result.  
A specific example of the NGO competition dilemma is what service delivery NGOs 
report on as defamation by peer organizations (Priller et al. 2012) or turf battles (Romzek et 
al. 2012). Again, the result of the competition dilemma ensues as a non-intended consequence 
of intentional behavior: What is intended as a prudent strategy to secure contractual 
relationships and funding turns out to be a substantive threat to the collective reputation of 
NGOs and their future capacity to collaborate in non-competitive issues. In the end, it’s the 
intended beneficiaries who foot the bill. 
It is important to bear in mind that in a many-sided dilemma, an individual self-
commitment can never solve the problem of collective self-damage. Starting from the status 
quo in Box III, a unilateral change of strategy by NGO 1 would lead to NGO 1’s worst 
outcome: the payoff would decline from 2 to 1 (Box IV). Mutual betterment is only possible 
by shifting from Box III to Box I, which requires a collective self-commitment of both NGOs 
to simultaneously change strategies (Fig. 2b). A sanction, s, to punish populist campaigns will 
be effective if it is severe enough to make sure that 4 – s ≺ 3 and that 2 – s ≺ 1. Thus, only a 
collective commitment device that simultaneously binds all actors involved can overcome the 
symmetric logic of the “NGO competition dilemma.”  
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In principle, the competition dilemma can be solved either by NGO self-regulation 
initiatives or by state regulation using the enforcement power of nation-state governance 
(Gugerty 2010, 1089). Yet, the governance literature remains skeptical about governments to 
provide the effective and nonpartisan enforcement necessary to produce the collective good of 
regulation, e.g. in financial regulation. The literature reports on state ineffectiveness in 
regulation on a global level (Irvin 2005) and on the national level (i.e. the case of New 
Zealand, cf. Cordery 2013, p. 848) as well as on the problem of state cooptation (e.g. in the 
case of Russia, cf. Burger 2012, p. 87). As a consequence, the governance literature on 
nonprofit management embraces NGO self-regulation as a favorable solution, although it is 
only starting to analyze such collective action within the club-goods framework (Prakash and 
Gugerty 2010). In an effort to contribute to understanding the different institutional forms of 
NGO self-regulation, Gugerty (2010, table 1, p. 1091) differentiates between “national 
systems (i.e. classical collective good as substitute to state regulation), voluntary standard 
clubs (i.e. collective club goods) and voluntary codes of conduct.”  
((3)) The conceptual distinction between a one-sided and a social dilemma adds an 
important aspect to the governance literature on NGO accountability. Table 1 is a 
modification of Crack’s (2011, p. 12) overview to describe the two waves of NGO 
Accountability, with first-wave accountability addressing donors and political authorities and 
second-wave reforms covering personnel, members, intended beneficiaries and peer 
organizations. In the real world, NGOs are embedded in a complex net of stakeholder 
relationships with specific and partly contradicting demands, which indicates that the 
stakeholder and the competition dilemma are not mutually exclusive but overlapping 
interaction problems.  
As a general rule of thumb, table 1 indicates that one-sided social dilemmas are more 
prevalent in first-wave stakeholder relations and many-sided dilemmas much more probable 
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in relation to second-wave stakeholders. In addition, when moving from left to right in Table 
1, one-sided dilemma situations face a gradually decreasing sanction potential by second-
wave stakeholders. This means that the increasing role of competitive pressure puts 
constraints on single NGOs to increase accountability by single individual efforts. To the 
extent that the “paradox of greater NGO accountability” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008, p. 1) 
is caused by competitive pressures to raise funds, and raising funds depends on media 
coverage and public awareness, it is unlikely that the underlying many-sided social dilemma 
will be solved on the organizational level of the individual NGO. This suggests that 
addressing governance reforms in NGO accountability relations to second-wave stakeholders 
(right side of Table 1) needs to rely much more on collective commitments than governance 
reforms in NGO accountability relations to first-wave stakeholders (left side of Table 1).  
------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------- 
An interesting example of how self-regulation initiatives can help shaping a whole panorama 
of diverse accountability relationships is the INGO Accountability Charter (INGO Charter 
2016). NGOs have established a wide range of organizational accountability mechanisms 
such as disclosure and reporting procedures that help overcome (one-sided) stakeholder 
dilemmas in various manifestations. From an ordonomic perspective, the INGO Charter is an 
attempt of large and influential international NGOs to improve the individual measures in all 
stakeholder relations, including first and second wave, by sectoral accountability standards, 
monitored by the INGO Charter’s genuine procedures. 
First wave: In relation to financial stakeholders (donors), NGOs may be tempted to use 
“exploitation” strategies by decreasing e.g. the quality of delivering services ex post of the 
contract, and use the spared resources to subsidize other activities (Cooley and Ron 2002). 
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When raising funds from private donors, NGOs may be inclined to hide their actual agenda 
and trick potential donors about the how they intent to use donations (Prakash and Gugerty 
2010). NGOs might also pretend meeting legal requirements to obtain advantages such as tax 
reductions without bearing the costs for legal compliance. In practice, financial and legal 
stakeholders possess a high sanctioning potential; they can (easily) withdraw funds or deny 
the legal status. This uneven distribution of power has prompted scholars to coin these 
relationships as “upward accountability” (Slim 2002), which means that exploitation 
strategies are only attractive in some rare cases of highly asymmetric distributed information. 
Providing reliable information in voluntary reporting and meeting legal requirements makes 
exploitation strategies even less attractive. The INGO Charter further supports these 
individual commitments of NGOs with an external review procedure that helps NGOs to 
signal credibility to financial and legal stakeholders more effectively (Prakash and Gugerty 
2010). 
Second wave: To a certain extent, the empirical success of upward accountability reforms 
in the first wave is reflected in complaints of both practitioners and scholars that NGOs have 
lost sight of less powerful stakeholders in “downward accountability,” giving rise to the so-
called “accountability paradox” (O’Dwyer and Unermann 2008). In ordonomic terms, NGO 
leadership might be tempted to use “concealing” strategies (“exploitation” in Fig. 1) to hide 
serious mistakes and misconduct in an effort to sustain member support and to acquire and 
retain a qualified and motivated staff (“support” in Fig. 1). In a similar way, NGOs may be 
inclined to set aside the interests of intended beneficiaries (“exploitation” in Fig. 1) to gain 
public support for funding campaigns (Slim 2002, p. 6). Such NGO strategies can easily 
backfire if scandals bring misbehavior or misrepresentation to light and lead to a decline of 
member and public support. Implementing downward accountability mechanisms such as 
organizational CHMs or stakeholder dialogues help increase the credibility of individual self-
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binding commitments to refrain from concealing and misrepresentation strategies and help 
save future member support and cooperation with intended beneficiaries, which again fosters 
organizational reputation.  
Recently, there is a growing awareness of downward accountability within NGOs, which, 
according to Schmitz et al. (2012, p. 1188) can be seen as an important “normative shift.” In 
practice, however, NGOs still struggle to be accountable to second-wave stakeholders. To 
address these challenges, the INGO Charter binds member NGOs to introduce CHMs within 
their organization which are monitored by an external review process. For example, 
Greenpeace International implemented CHMs in almost half of their national chapters and 
received over 8500 supporter complaints in 2014 in relation to advocacy positions (approx. 
1000), fundraising methods (approx. 1500) and breaching core values (approx. 4000) 
(Greenpeace Accountability Report 2014). In addition to the organizational CHM, the INGO 
Charter installed a ‘sectoral’ CHM that allows complaints to be addressed directly to the 
Charter if supporters believe that their complaints have not been adequately addressed and 
responded to by the individual NGO’s CHM. From an ordonomic perspective, the INGO 
charter’s CHMs can thus not only be seen as a service for single NGOs to improve the 
credibility of their individual self-commitments toward financial stakeholders (first wave), but 
also toward members and intended beneficiaries (second wave). In particular, the sectoral 
CHM creates additional incentives for individual NGOs to credibly bind itself to the promise 
not to exploit its stakeholders, including intended beneficiaries. In contrast to Prakash and 
Gugerty (2010), our rational-choice approach is capable of reconstructing and analyzing 
second-wave accountability mechanisms because it uses on open concept of utility.  
Of course, we fully acknowledge the limited applicability of the stakeholder dilemma as 
heuristic to foster accountability to second-wave stakeholders, in particular when competitive 
processes create dysfunctional incentives for NGOs. From our ordonomic perspective, the 
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INGO Charter can also be seen as a (potential) means to address a wider range of collective 
challenges including several manifestations of the competition dilemma. Seen in this light, 
peer accountability mechanisms are a form of collective self-binding commitments to a 
variety of accountability standards that are monitored by an external review process. By doing 
so, NGOs collectively infuse order (Williamson 2009; p. 456) to a formerly unregulated space 
and generate mutual gains for themselves and their stakeholders. But competition dilemmas 
are not limited to advocacy issues, they also appear in service delivery. For example, in 
specific contexts of institutionalized corruption (Fowler 2013, p. 21), NGO staff members 
might be tempted to apply corruptive practices when competing with other NGOs for projects 
with local authorities. Negative reputational effects for donors as well as for intended 
beneficiaries are the likely consequence. The INGO Charter can be seen as an attempt to 
create a collective self-binding commitment to implement of whistle-blowing systems on a 
sector-wide basis. Relying on review procedures and sectoral CHMs, the INGO Charter 
would be able to identify and sanction those organizations that do not comply with anti-
corruption standards, mainly through peer disapproval and loss of membership status. While 
donation and funding are surely the most obvious levels of competition among NGOs, the 
INGO Charter also raises sectoral standards with respect to “Ethical Fundraising” (INGO 
Charter 2016) that redlines effective, but morally controversial fundraising techniques (Manzo 
2008). In relation to intended beneficiaries, the INGO Charter’s principle ‘Responsible 
Advocacy’ sets standards how to generate responsible and exit irresponsible advocacy 
positions, which again can be seen as a solution to the competition dilemma of responsible 
campaigning. The current difficulties of NGOs to address the collective challenges of public 
accountability (Lang 2013) again highlight the need for a rational-choice approach capable of 
reconstructing and analyzing the underlying interaction problems and generating ideas to 
overcome collective self-damage. 
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4 How to Move Forward: Implications for a “Third Wave” of NGO Accountability 
Reforms 
This paper is intended to take the literature forward in developing a comprehensive rational-
choice-based governance approach of NGO behavior that paves the way for adequate reform 
proposals. We believe that our framework adds value to the literature because it facilitates 
fresh thinking about both new and established mechanisms to improve NGO accountability. 
In particular, we believe our approach helpful in theorizing about what Crack (2013a, p. 12) 
calls a “third wave of reforms to strengthen the institutionalization of dialogic and peer 
accountability,” i.e. the implementation of (stakeholder) dialogues to empower ‘intended’ 
beneficiaries. This is viewed in the literature as an extremely difficult challenge, and 
observers remain skeptical about its potential of implementation due to high opportunity costs 
and a lack of skills. 
The rational-choice perspective developed in this paper helps understand better the 
working properties of the first two reform waves and also to identify the key drivers of future 
reforms. In general, first wave governance reforms have primarily addressed principal-agent 
problems in one-sided social dilemma structures between NGOs and donors/legal authorities. 
Though relatively easy to implement and useful to establish trustful relationships with donors 
and legal authorities, the literature highlights that these reforms may have the additional 
adverse effect to dilute NGO efforts from staying accountable to members/personnel, peers 
and intended beneficiaries—a tendency that prompted second wave governance reforms. Our 
framework highlights that the biggest challenge of second wave reforms is NGO 
accountability towards intended beneficiaries, with different consequences on three different 
levels:  
(i) NGO accountability toward intended beneficiaries can be reconstructed as a one-sided 
dilemma structure (“stakeholder dilemma”) if stakeholders are (en)able(d) to articulate 
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powerful feedback, the impact of which would be crucial for an individual NGO’s reputation. 
For example, Amnesty International was heavily criticized in public discussions for adopting 
a policy of decriminalization of prostitution to protect the human rights of sex workers. In 
responding to this criticism, AI referred to a profound research and consultation process, 
which included various discussions with a wide range of stakeholders and an opinion survey 
among more than two hundred sex workers (Amnesty International 2015b). According to our 
ordonomic interpretation, AI was able to withstand strong public opposition because they 
invested (heavily) into an individual self-commitment to stay accountable, i.e. to speak 
‘responsibly’ on behalf of their ‘intended‘ beneficiaries. Yet this self-commitment is only 
possible because sex workers could easily object to AI’s openly declared positions, which 
would do serious harm to AI’s reputation as a ‘true’ advocate of their interests.  
(ii) AI’s “involvement of affected stakeholder groups” is considered a best practice 
example by the INGO Accountability Charter (2015) and surely deserves commendation. Yet, 
this formal recognition of AI’s performance also indicates that effective dialogic 
accountability mechanisms are still rare. Our framework can show why: As Prakash and 
Gugerty (2010) point out, accountability to donors is not necessarily separated from the 
accountability to beneficiaries and accountability to donors can partly substitute 
accountability to beneficiaries. By the same token, ‘NGO accountability to intended 
beneficiaries’ is not necessarily separated from ‘NGO accountability to peers,’ and 
accountability to peers can substitute accountability to beneficiaries. The transition from 
beneficiaries to peers is a promising avenue due to the overlapping interests among both 
groups and the characteristics that most NGO peers share. First, intended beneficiaries and 
NGO peers have a shared interest in sector-wide responsible advocacy: intended beneficiaries 
with regard to the effectiveness of proposed policies by their advocates and NGO peers with 
regard to safeguarding their collective reputation and identity as promoters of the common 
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good. Second, NGO peers have the expertise to evaluate the focal NGO’s performance, and 
third, NGO peers have access to relevant information on potential free-rider activities due to 
increasing network communication among NGO peers (Romzek et al. 2012).  
However, it seems that NGO self-regulation initiatives still struggle to generate sufficient 
sanction potential or additional benefits to “solve issues of compliance, implementation and 
enforcement that follow initial stages of standard setting” (Sidel 2010, p. 15). Recent research 
indicates that even those initiatives with strong external review procedures and sectoral 
CHMs face collective action problems. As an example, a study by the INGO Charter 
assessing the accountability performance of 40 leading international CSOs [including 25 
member organizations] shows that “many CSOs haven’t formulated and systemised a 
clearance process/fact check” (INGO Charter 2016b, p. 11), although all member 
organizations committed themselves to the Principle of Responsible Advocacy (INGO 
Charter 2016a). In addition, many member organizations are shown to miss a fully 
functioning CHM, which is the basic requirement for membership in the INGO Charter 
(INGO Charter 2016b, p. 10). Of course, on this basis it seems easy to criticize self-regulation 
initiatives for their lack of effectiveness in terms of compliance to committed standards. Yet, 
as we do, one could also interpret this self-exposure of serious accountability shortcomings as 
a signal to external stakeholders that the INGO Charter takes its commitments seriously and 
that member organizations need to show significant progress in the future.  
Thus, the greatest challenges of second wave governance reforms culminates in 
establishing sectoral standards that address the competition dilemma in NGO advocacy. 
Though numerous voluntary regional and international initiatives have created accountability 
standards for the whole NGO sector (Hammer et al. 2010, p. 4-5), some most of them lack 
effective governance mechanism to identify and sanction non-compliance (Sidel 2010). One 
reason is that competing self-regulation initiatives may be tempted to lower their 
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accountability standards in order to attract new members. Preventing race-to-the-bottom 
dynamics on the level of standards is an extraordinary challenge that requires mutual 
acknowledge and partly harmonization of competing accountability frameworks to establish 
comprehensive sectoral standards. 
 (iii) A way to facilitate NGO sector-wide solutions can be seen in bi-sectoral initiatives, 
which could help enhance the effectiveness of collective self-regulation of NGOs. Though 
there are examples of bi-sectoral partnerships between the private sector and nation-state 
authorities or even supranational authorities (e.g. United Nations Global Compact, Forrest 
Stewardship Council, Marine Stewardship Council), incorporating state authorities in NGO 
sector-wide accountability standards does not come without a risk. Thus, it might be much 
easier to think about bi-sectoral initiatives between companies and NGOs as a balanced 
partnership of equals. In fact, competition to attract public attention is not limited to the NGO 
sector, but also involves the for-profit sector. As a result, it might be worth discussing a 
partnership such as a “global responsible communication standard”11. For sure, the 
development of such a standard would be an extraordinary challenge due to conflicting 
interests and the potentially large number of participants. Yet, it could refer to and, in part, 
also build upon already established accountability standards within the NGO sector. For 
example, the INGO Accountability Charter (2016a) has a “responsible advocacy” standard 
that states: “[b]eing responsible in our public criticism, ensuring it amounts to fair public 
comment and giving a right of reply.”  
Crack’s (2013a) two-wave framework of accountability reforms reproduces the broad and 
overall chronological order of governance reforms. Each reform wave builds on the former, 
with the later wave incorporating the former. However, our analysis draws particular attention 
                                                 
11 We owe the idea of a “global responsible communication standard” to Kernaghan Webb. He outlined this 
concept as a way of fostering trustful and fair dialogues among actors of different sectors, in particular between 
business firms and civil society. 
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to a second dimension that works in the opposite direction. In addition to the chronological 
dimension, there are also potentially positive feedback effects, which means that higher wave 
reforms can also support the effectiveness of lower wave reforms to solve accountability 
challenges. While there has been a great deal of discussion about the potential of NGO 
accountability to foster organizational learning (Slim 2002, Ebrahim 2005), the ‘competition 
dilemma’ underlines the need for a learning process to mitigate the adverse effects caused by 
unregulated competition. “Third” wave reform initiatives (such as discussing about and 
implementing a bi-sectoral initiative) can facilitate NGO sector-wide initiatives to establish 
higher communication standards (Will and Pies 2016). In addition, developing an effective 
regulatory regime for peer accountability to solve the competition dilemma of NGO advocacy 
can be seen as a “sectoral learning process” that translates into positive incentives to solve the 
stakeholder dilemma via accountability mechanism such as the CHM or stakeholder 
dialogues. 
In sum, our ordonomic social dilemma analysis provides an ‘alternative’ reconstruction of 
relationships in NGO accountability. On the ideational level, this approach does not rely on 
pure good will of NGOs. Its unique feature is to incorporate value-based and organizational 
interests of NGOs, including monetary and non-monetary, in its analysis. From a pragmatic 
perspective, thus, the proposed reforms promote a crystal clear win-win orientation which 
should help NGOs to effectively engage in self-regulation. As an illustration, Prakash and 
Gugerty’s (2010, p. 4 and 10) use of rational-choice theory leads them to view self-regulation 
clubs primarily as a means to satisfy the needs of important financial stakeholder such as 
donors. In criticizing this perspective, Deloffre (2010, p. 191) points out that “humanitarian 
NGOs designed accountability clubs in order to meet their perceived moral duty, not in 
response to agency dilemmas.” In fact, according to our framework, these views do not 
contradict each other, but both are deserving of merit in their own right. The ordonomic use of 
rational-choice theory suggests an ideational perspective that both NGO goals—donor 
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interests and the moral mission—can be assigned to different levels in a multiple means-end 
scheme. In analogy to AI’s commitment to waive financial resources of governments or 
political parties, accountability clubs can be interpreted as a means to serve the interim end of 
satisfying the needs of donors (Prakash and Gugerty 2010), which in turn serves as a means to 
achieve the final end of living up to their moral mission (Deloffre 2010).  
Conclusion and Further Research 
Fostering NGO accountability is a complex issue that includes not only practical but also 
conceptual challenges with enormous social relevance. To support this endeavor, we have 
developed a comprehensive rational-choice based governance framework to interpret the 
stakeholder relationships of NGOs as interaction problems and we identify two archetypical 
dilemma structures: the “stakeholder dilemma” between the NGO and a single accountability 
holder as a one-sided social dilemma and the “competition dilemma” among rival NGOs as 
many-sided social dilemma. We also believe that our framework supports NGOs and their 
managers to put the issue of competition among NGOs high on the agenda of their networks, 
cooperation and alliances and to design and implement (more) effective forms of self-
regulation.  
In terms of future research, our analysis suggests at least three ways for future research 
efforts: First, our analysis shows that NGOs face difficulties addressing both the stakeholder 
and the competition dilemma. A potential remedy can be seen in integrating credible third 
parties as facilitators of individual and collective self-binding commitments, which can be 
seen as services for individual and collective forms of self-commitment (cf. Pies et al. 2009, p. 
388 et seq.) For example, the problem of NGOs to provide credible knowledge about the 
effects of promoted policies to intended beneficiaries can be mitigated by partnering with 
scientific bodies (Copestake 2014). Cooperating with scientists provides an opportunity for 
high quality evaluations and policy analysis if these academic bodies face adequate incentives 
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to maintain a strong reputation of academic integrity and respectability. While such external 
evaluation processes represent a prudent NGO strategy vis-á-vis a one-sided social dilemma 
with well-intentioned funders, an individual NGO might face a strong disincentive to engage 
in such practices in a competitive funding environment. However, seen from the collective 
perspective of all NGOs affected by negative reputation, there is a strong collective interest of 
the group of NGOs to raise sectoral standards by appropriate governance mechanisms, even if 
these efforts are only supported by single but large funders and, thus, fall short of providing a 
complete, sanction-based NGO self-regulation in the first place. 
Second, long-term studies on the results of industry self-regulation in the corporate sector 
underline the need for a better understanding of effective governance mechanisms that 
guarantee high (moral) standards of organizational behavior. Most recently, multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSI) such as the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) have been heavily criticized 
for their lack of effectiveness, low-quality standards and lack of stakeholder support (Moog et 
al. 2015). Though we suggest thinking in more detail about the potential of bi- and multi-
sectoral initiatives to enhance NGO accountability, their critical working properties—
including the self-perception of NGOs as pure promoters of the common good—remain an 
important question for further research.  
Third, we have treated NGOs as collective, “single unitarian” moral actors throughout this 
paper. On the one hand, this is a reasonable methodological decision to reduce complexity 
insofar as the moral misconduct of a single NGO personnel or volunteer can easily and 
directly translate into reputational damages for the focal NGO. To address the negative actual 
and future consequences, the NGO then has no other choice but to react as a collective actor 
using organizational counter measures. On the other hand, although not in the immediate 
focus of this present paper, our rational-choice-based governance approach can be equally 
applied to intra-organizational relationships within a particular NGO. For example, moral 
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misconduct in interactions between different “hierarchical” levels can be analyzed using a 
one-sided social dilemma. Focusing on e.g. the interaction between NGO managers and NGO 
employees could study the potential for managers to exploit employees or vice versa, which 
could result in a morally undesired situation such as withholding important information about 
specific NGO activities that can unintentionally lead to misrepresenting interests or silencing 
voices of intended beneficiaries. Moral misconduct could also take place among equals, i.e. 
among NGO volunteers on the same level within the NGO “hierarchy.” Such a situation could 
be analyzed with a many-sided social dilemma, and it could highlight how moral standards 
can easily erode within a team if a moral leadership is absent that places high priority on 
supporting moral standards with adequate intra-organizational governance arrangements. 
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Figure 2: The NGO Competition Dilemma 
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Table 1: The Two Waves of NGO Accountabiltiy related to two Forms of Social Dilemmas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
